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INTRODUCTION 
 For decades, James Wilson has been something of a “forgotten founder.”1  The reasons 
for this are puzzling.  Commentators as distinguished as Max Farrand and Clinton Rossiter have 
recognized his influence at the Constitutional Convention.2  Indeed, recent historical scholarship 
based recently discovered documentary evidence suggests that Wilson may have played a more 
significant role in the initial draft of the Constitution than widely believed.3 
                                                 
* John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
1 Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s Revolutionary: James Wilson and the Birth of American Jurisprudence, 29 J.L. & 
POL. 189, 189 (2014); accord Nicholas Pederson, Note, The Lost Founder: James Wilson in American Memory, 22 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 257 (2010) (tracing Wilson’s initial obscurity, increasing interest, and present neglect since 
1988). 
2 See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (1913) (describing 
Wilson as “[s]econd to Madison and almost on a par with him” and even “[i]n some respects . . . Madison's 
intellectual superior”); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 247–48 (1966) (calling Wilson 
“[s]econd only to Madison—and an honorable second”); accord MARK DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON 21 (1997) (noting that James Bryce, Randolph G. Adams, and Robert McCloskey 
cited Wilson as no lower the second in influence at the Convention). 
3 Pederson, supra note 1, at 269 (citing Lorianne Updike Toler, Missing Documents and Constitutional 
Treasures: (Re)Discoveries in Volume 2 of James Wilson’s Papers at the Pennsylvania Historical Society 5 (2010) 
(unpublished manuscript)). 
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 The area where commentators generally recognize Wilson’s influence at the Convention 
is with respect to Article II, which establishes the executive and defines its powers.4  Most 
scholars characterize him as a resolute advocate of an independent, energetic, and unitary 
presidency,5 and a particularly successful one at that.6  In this regard, some scholars have 
generally characterized Wilson’s thinking as overly rigid,7 perhaps abetted by a personality that 
William Ewald has aptly characterized as “cerebral, bookish, and aloof.”8 
 Yet a close examination of the Convention reveals Wilson to be more flexible than 
sometimes characterized.  With respect to many aspects of the presidency, including the 
appointment power, the use of an advisory council, the veto power, and presidential selection, he 
adopted a more pragmatic approach than generally recognized.  The most dramatic example of 
this is an event that is almost entirely overlooked in the historical record:  Wilson’s break late in 
the Convention from his consistent support for a unitary executive by proposing an advisory 
council to advise the president on appointments.9   
 While initially seeming like something of a puzzle, the reasons for Wilson’s change of 
heart become clearer when debates over presidential power are placed in the context of the larger 
controversies that dominated the Convention, such as the Great Compromise and presidential re-
                                                 
4 See, e.g., William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 
950–51 (2008) (noting that “it is clear that over the course of the Convention [Madison] was following Wilson on 
. . . matters [of executive power] rather than the other way around”). 
5 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Law, 104 YALE 
L.J. 541, 608 (1994) (calling Wilson “the intellectual father of Article II’s vigorous, independent Executive”); 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 742–52 (calling Wilson a 
“well-known champion of an energetic executive”). 
6 Prakash, supra note 5, at 777 (observing that “advocates of a strong executive nearly ran the table” at the 
Convention). 
7 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 196, 198 (calling Wilson less “adaptable” and “practical” than Madison); Robert 
Green McCloskey, Introduction, 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 9 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) 
(describing Wilson as having “a confidence in ideas and an impulse to push them to the limits of their implications 
without great regard for practicalities”). 
8 Ewald, supra note 4, at 925. 
9 The only acknowledgement of Wilson’s change of position of which I am aware is a passing mention in 
Robert E. DiClerico, James Wilson’s Presidency, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 301, 313 (1987). 
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eligibility and selection.  This broader frame suggests that Wilson held a more pragmatic, less 
doctrinaire vision of executive power than is commonly recognized.   
I. THE PRESIDENCY AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
 The basic timeline of the Convention is well known.  Although the Convention convened 
on May 14, 1787, it did not achieve a quorum until May 25 and did not begin its work in earnest 
until May 29, when Edmund Randolph submitted the fifteen resolutions laying out the Virginia 
Plan.  The Convention debated and amended the Virginia Plan as a committee of the whole for 
two weeks until June 15, when William Paterson introduced an alternate set of resolutions that 
constituted the New Jersey Plan.  After five more days of debate, the committee of the whole 
rejected the New Jersey Plan in favor of the modified Virginia plan, which prompted two small 
state delegations to walk out.  The disagreement between the large states and the small states 
continued to fester until Connecticut proposed the Great Compromise on June 29, which the 
Convention approved on July 16. 
 After ten days of further debate, the Convention appointed a Committee of Detail on July 
26 to distill the various resolutions into a single document.  The Committee of Detail issued its 
report on August 4, and the Convention reconvened on August 6.  On August 31, the Convention 
appointed a Committee of Eleven (consisting of one representative from each state) to resolve 
the remaining issues.  On September 8, the Convention turned the document over to a Committee 
of Style, which reported its work on September 12.  After some further minor amendments, all 
but three of the delegates signed the Constitution on September 17 (specifically Elbridge Gerry, 
George Mason, and Edmund Randolph).  It is noteworthy that Wilson was one of the five 
4 
members of the Committee of Detail, possibly serving as the sole author of the initial draft10 and 
generally recognized as the primary author of the final draft.11  Wilson also played an important 
supporting role in the Committee of Style.12 
 From the standpoint of the presidency, four important debates occurred at the 
Convention.  Section A reviews the relatively uncontroversial dispute over whether the executive 
power should be vested in a single person or either a triumvirate.  Section B analyzes the 
somewhat more protracted discussion of whether the single executive should be supplemented by 
an advisory council modeled on the British Privy Council, which became intertwined with the 
debate over the appointment power, including Wilson’s surprising deviation from his opposition 
to such an institution late in the Convention.  Sections C and D describe Wilson’s pragmatism 
during debates over the veto and the method for presidential selection.   
A. Single Executive vs. Triumvirate 
 As prior scholars have noted, the Framers clearly rejected proposals to establish an 
executive triumvirate and instead embraced vesting the executive power in a single individual.  
Specifically, the Convention approved the idea of a unitary executive on June 4 (prior to the 
Great Compromise) by a vote of 7 to 313 and reaffirmed that decision by affirmation on July 17 
(after the Great Compromise) and on August 24 (after the Committee on Detail).14 
                                                 
10 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
11 DiClerico, supra note 9, at 310. 
12 Id. at 302. 
13 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 113 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 
FARRAND]. 
14 2 id. at 29. 
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 The Virginia Plan, which was submitted on May 29 and devised principally by 
Madison,15 said relatively little about the executive.16  The seventh resolution simply stated that 
“[a] National Executive be instituted” and would be “chosen by the National Legislature.”17  The 
executive’s salary could not be reduced, and the executive would be “ineligible a second time.”18  
It would enjoy “a general authority to execute the National laws” as well as “the Executive rights 
vested in Congress by the Confederation.”19   
 As soon as the Convention began its consideration of the seventh resolution on June 1, 
Wilson moved to fill the void in the Virginia Plan by proposing an amendment specifying that 
the executive would “consist of a single person.”20  Madison’s notes report that this proposal was 
followed by a “[a] considerable pause,” after which Benjamin Franklin noted that the issue was 
of great importance and implored the delegates to state their views.21  Edmund Rutledge 
similarly chided the delegates for their reticence and offered his support for Wilson’s proposal on 
the ground that a single executive would feel the most accountable and would lead to better 
administration, although he would withhold from the executive the power of war and peace.22   
 Roger Sherman disagreed, arguing that the composition of the executive should be left to 
the legislature.23  Randolph offered an even stronger critique, condemning unity in the executive 
“as the fœtus of monarchy.”24  He instead suggested that the executive power be placed in three 
                                                 
15 Ewald, supra note 4, at 934. 
16 Indeed, Madison, who was the architect of the Virginia Plan, confessed that he had given little thought to 
how the executive should be constituted and what powers it should wield.  Id. at 946 (quoting Letter from James 
Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 9 APRIL 1786–24 MAY 1787, at 
370 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975)).  
17 1 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 21. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 63.  Charles Pinckney seconded the motion.  Id. 
21 Id. at 65. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 65. 
24 Id. at 66. 
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people, arguing that a triumvirate could also exercise vigor, dispatch, and responsibility and 
would make the executive more independent.”25   
 It was during these initial debates that Wilson laid the conceptual foundation for a unitary 
executive.  In his initial statement, Wilson emphasized that placing the executive power in a 
single person would give it the most energy and accountability.26  Giving the power of 
appointment to a single person would make clear who was responsible for choosing a particular 
official, while a plural executive would allow officials to evade responsibility.27  In his second 
statement, he argued that far from being the embryo of monarchy, a single executive represented 
the best protection against tyranny in that a complex executive may be more prone to turn into a 
despotism than a single one and, as reported colorfully in Pierce’s notes, “as bad as the thirty 
Tyrants of Athens, or as the Decemvirs of Rome.”28  If a plural executive conducts it affairs 
poorly, “on whom shall we fix the blame?  Whom shall we select as the object of punishment?”29  
Unlike legislatures, which are subject primarily to the internal constraints inherent in their 
divisions, “the restraints on the executive power are external,” that is by the voting public.30  
Wilson continued, “These restraints are applied with greatest certainty, and with greatest 
efficacy, when the object of restraint is clearly ascertained.  This is best done, when one object 
only, distinguished and responsible, is conspicuously held up to the view and examination of the 
publick.”31 
 That Wilson would emerge as the unitary executive’s strongest proponent should come as 
no surprise.  He had advanced similar ideas in his lectures on law three years earlier, which 
                                                 
25 Id. at 65, 71. 
26 Id. at 65, 70. 
27 Id. at 70. 
28 Id. at 66, 71, 74. 
29 Id.. 
30 Id. at 293, 294. 
31 Id. 
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offered two justifications for unity.  The first was the need for democratic accountability.  In 
contrast to the legislature, in which restraint is accomplished by dividing power, “The executive 
power, in order to be restrained, should be one.”32  While Congress relies primarily on internal 
restraints, “the restraints are on the executive power are external.”33  Such external constraints 
“are applied with greatest certainty, and with the greatest efficacy, when the object of restraint is 
clearly ascertained” and “when one objet only, distinguished and responsible, is conspicuously 
held up to the view and examination of the publick.”34 
 The second was the need for vigor and dispatch, particularly in the case of emergencies, 
which would be dissipated if “to every enterprise, mutual communication, mutual consultation, 
and mutual agreement among men, perhaps of discordant views, of discordant tempers, and of 
discordant interests, are indispensably necessary.”35  Placing the executive power “in the hands 
of one person, who is to direct all the subordinate officers of that department” would lead to 
“promptitude, activity, firmness, consistency, and energy.”36 
 The notes of the Convention are somewhat contradictory with respect to Madison’s 
position.  Madison’s own notes indicate that he sought to remain noncommittal by postponing 
the decision between executive unity and plurality until the powers wielded by the executive had 
been defined.37  King’s notes, in contrast, indicate that Madison stated that a single executive 
                                                 
32 James Wilson, Lectures on Law:  X – Of Government, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 383, 400 (Bird 
Wilson ed., Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 403–04. 
37 1 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 66 (“before a choice shd. be made between a unity and a plurality in the 
Executive”); id. at 67 (“whether administered by one or more persons”).  Pierce reports that Dickinson concurred.  
Id. at 74. 
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was probably the best plan.38  Pierce’s notes record that Madison favored placing the executive 
power in a single person aided by an advisory council.39   
 In any event, it appears that Wilson himself seconded Madison’s motion to postpone 
consideration of Wilson’s proposal, and the Convention approved the motion by unanimous 
consent.40  The Convention returned to the issue the next day late on June 2 and discussed it 
further on June 4.  Wilson responded directly to Randolph’s claims that a single executive would 
be tantamount to monarchy and unacceptable to the people by pointing out that all thirteen states 
placed the executive authority in a single individual.41  A single executive would also lead to 
greater tranquility.  If all three members of a plural executive wielded equal power, they would 
be in constant disagreement; whereas if their power was asymmetric, the benefits of tripartite 
balance would be lost.42  Moreover, should an issue have more than two sides, the executive 
could well deadlock, with each of the executives espousing a different position.43   
 A number of delegates supported Wilson.  Butler argued that unity was critical in military 
matters and responded to Randolph’s criticism that a unitary executive would ignore the remote 
parts of the country by arguing that a unitary executive would be more likely to represent all 
parts of the country impartially.44  Sherman offered his support for a unitary executive (although, 
as discussed in the next section, he favored annexing a council to the single magistrate).45  
Elbridge Gerry concurred, arguing that a plural executive would be extremely inconvenient, 
particularly in military matters, which would be tantamount to a general with three heads.46   
                                                 
38 Id. at 70. 
39 Id. at 74. 
40 Id. at 66–67. 
41 Id. at 96, 105, 109. 
42 Id. at 96 
43 Id. at 96, 105, 109. 
44 Id. at 88–89. 
45 Id. at 97, 105. 
46 Id. at 97, 105. 
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 A handful of voices spoke in disagreement.  A document found in George Mason’s 
papers that Farrand believes is a speech given on June 447 arguing in favor of a three-person 
executive,48 although Mason was not present for the vote.49  Mason warned that single executives 
tend to degenerate into a monarchy, whereas a plural executive could represent different parts of 
the country.50  The Convention nonetheless approved Wilson’s motion by a vote of 7 states to 
3.51 
 Aside from the inclusion of a plural executive in the New Jersey Plan52 and side 
comments made during debates on the veto and the appointment powers,53 the Convention did 
not return its focus to the topic until July 17, immediately after the Great Compromise and prior 
to the appointment of the Committee of Detail, when it reaffirmed its embrace of a single 
executive by affirmation.54  Aside from a comment on July 24 by Hugh Williamson offered 
during the debate over whether the President should be appointed by Congress,55 the issue did 
not arise again until August 2, when it was once again reaffirmed by unanimous consent.56 
 The choice of a single executive over a plural one thus ultimately proved relatively 
uncontroversial.  As Madison noted in a letter to Thomas Jefferson following the Convention, the 
plural executive “had finally but few advocates” aside from Randolph.57  A tally of those who 
spoke and voted in favor of the proposition confirms Madison’s observation, revealing that only 
                                                 
47 Id. at 110 n.26. 
48 Id. at 114. 
49 Id. at 97, 101. 
50 Id. at 113. 
51 Id. at 93. 
52 Id. at 244. 
53 Id. at 100, 101–02, 103, 107, 139. 
54 2 id. at 29. 
55 Id. at 100. 
56 Id. at 401. 
57 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND, supra note 13, 
at 131, 132. 
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twelve of the forty-five delegates currently in attendance supported a plural executive.58  
Moreover, it is telling that the two most vocal proponents of the plural executive (Randolph and 
Mason) found the final document so repugnant that they refused to sign it. 
 Wilson would reiterate his support for the unitary executive in his remarks before the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, where he noted that plural bodies “cannot plan well, act 
decisively, or keep the common good in view.”59  Wilson argued that government is most 
effective when “the executive authority is one . . . . The executive power is better to be trusted 
when it has no screen. . . . . We well know what numerous executives are.  We know there is 
neither vigor, decision, nor responsibility in them.”  Indeed, having a “single magistrate” 
promotes “strength, vigor, energy, and responsibility in the executive department.”60 
 The Constitutional Convention thus yielded an unusually clear decision on whether the 
executive should be headed by a single person or a plural institution.  Concluding that the 
executive power should reside in a single individual left unanswered many key questions about 
what powers that person would wield. 
B. Proposals for an Executive Council, the Appointment Power, and Wilson’s Big 
Switch 
 The Convention similarly rejected the idea of supplementing the president with an 
executive council similar to the British Privy Council, although this idea received occasional 
support during the course of the Convention and ultimately became intertwined with the debate 
                                                 
58 FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 240 
& n.48 (1985). 
59 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES:  PENNSYLVANIA 450, 451, 475 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
60 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 495, 579 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT]. 
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over the appointment power.  It was initially debated and arguably implicitly rejected during 
consideration of Wilson’s amendment endorsing a unitary executive during the opening days of 
the Convention.  It would be subsequently be re-proposed following the Great Compromise, 
endorsed by the Committee of Detail, rejected by the Committee of Eleven, and then debated and 
rejected again in the closing days of the Convention.  Perhaps most surprisingly and most 
importantly for purposes of this Article, Wilson consistently opposed the idea of an executive 
council until the final debate, when, in an important event the significance of which has not yet 
been noted in the literature, he surprisingly switched sides. 
 The idea of an executive council was first advanced by Gerry on June 1, who, despite 
supporting a single executive,61 averred that such a council would add gravitas to and inspire 
greater public confidence in the executive.62  King’s and Pierce’s notes report that Madison 
endorsed the idea of a council as well, albeit one that operated in a purely advisory capacity.63  
Williamson also favored the idea, arguing that there was no difference between a single 
executive supplemented by a Council and an executive triumvirate.64 
 The Convention again debated the idea of an executive council when it returned to 
Wilson’s proposal on June 4.  Sherman argued in favor of such a council, pointing out that all of 
the states possessed such an institution and that even the British King was subject to the advice 
of the Privy Council.65  Wilson, however, came out firmly against the idea because such a 
council would tend to obscure responsibility for any malpractices that may occur.66  This 
exchange provides some support for the inference that the Convention’s subsequent approval of 
                                                 
61 1 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 97.  
62 Id. at 66, 70–71. 
63 Id. at 70, 74. 
64 Id. at 71. 
65 Id. at 97, 105. 
66 Id. at 97. 
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Wilson’s proposal on June 4 represented an implicit rejection the idea of an executive council as 
well. 
 At the same time the Convention weighed the merits of an advisory council, it also 
engaged in a parallel debate over the appointment power.  The original Virginia Plan proposed 
on May 29 provided that judges be appointed by the national legislature.67  On June 1, Madison 
successfully moved that the power to appoint all other officers rest with the executive.68  Wilson 
offered his support, arguing as noted earlier that appointment, along with the power to execute 
the law, represented the only quintessentially executive powers.69  Allowing a plurality of 
individuals to wield the appointment power instead of a single executive would destroy all 
responsibility.70 
 On June 5, the Convention addressed the nomination of lower court judges.  During this 
debate, Wilson again complained that placing the appointment power in a plural body invariably 
devolved into intrigue, partiality, and concealment.71  According to Madison’s notes, Wilson 
further contended, “A principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers might be 
appointed by a single person.”72  Rutledge and Franklin opposed Wilson out of concern that 
presidential appointment would give the executive too much power.73   
 Madison characteristically equivocated.  On the one hand, he questioned allowing 
legislatures to appoint judges because of their tendency towards partiality and their lack of the 
background to assess potential judges’ qualifications.74  On the other hand, he disliked giving so 
                                                 
67 1 FARRAND, supra note 13, at 21, 28. 
68 Id. at 63, 67, 70. 
69 Id. at 66. 
70 Id. at 70. 
71 Id. at 119, 126, 127. 
72 Id. at 119. 
73 Id. at 119–20. 
74 Id. at 120.   
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much power to the executive, suggesting perhaps that the power be given to the Senate alone.75  
Rather than resolve this conundrum, Madison attempted to buy time by proposing that the clause 
determining who should appoint lower-court judges be struck out and left blank, a proposal that 
was approved by a vote of 9 to 2.76  Wilson immediately offered a statement that he would 
oppose any future attempt to give legislatures the power to appoint judges, which was met by an 
equally determined statement by Pinckney in favor of legislative appointment of judges.77   
 This attempt to postpone addressing this issue was quickly derailed by Rutledge.  In an 
attempt to protect the prerogatives of state courts, Rutledge successfully pushed through an 
amendment deleting the clause affirmatively creating inferior federal courts.78  In a sharp 
reversal of position, this prompted Wilson and Madison to push through compromise language 
that, instead of creating inferior federal courts by virtue of the Constitution itself, gave Congress 
the power to create such courts if it so wished.  Although Butler complained about the fineness 
of the distinction, the Convention approved the amendment by a vote of 8 to 2, with 1 state 
divided.79  As later summaries revealed, this was taken to give the legislature the power to 
appoint lower court judges.80 
 On June 13, Pinckney prevailed pushed through an amendment favoring senatorial 
appointment of the Supreme Court,81 but only after proposing and withdrawing an amendment to 
involve both houses of Congress.82  According to the summaries of the then-current state of the 
proposals, the Convention gave the Senate the power to appoint the members of the Supreme 
                                                 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 116, 120, 126. 
77 Id. at 120–21. 
78 Id. at 118, 125. 
79 Id. at 118, 125, 127. 
80 Id. at 226, 231, 237. 
81 Id. at 224, 226, 230, 233, 238. 
82 Id. at 232, 238. 
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Court, the entire Congress the power to appoint lower court judges, and the executive the power 
to appoint all other offices.83 
 The Convention returned to the issue on July 18 following the Great Compromise and 
before the document had been referred to the Committee of Detail.  Wilson’s proposal to vest the 
sole power to appoint judges in the executive failed by a vote of 2 to 6.84  A compromise 
proposal supported by Wilson that would have adopted the solution that would ultimately 
prevail, giving the executive the power to nominate with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
failed by an equally divided vote of 4 to 4.85  The Convention postponed consideration on a third 
proposal submitted by Madison, which would have given the executive the power to nominate 
the members of the Supreme Court and gave the Senate the power to overturn a nomination 
based on a two-thirds vote.86  A final proposal that gave the legislature the power to appoint 
lower court judges passed unanimously by a vote 9 to 0.87   
 The Convention returned to Madison’s compromise proposal on July 21, when it was 
defeated by a vote of 3 to 6.88  The Convention then approved the provision giving the Senate the 
power to appoint the members of the Supreme Court by a vote of 6 to 3.89 
 The issue now passed to the Committee of Detail, which despite the fact that Wilson bore 
the laboring oar in drafting the report, expanded the legislature’s role in appointments.  
Specifically, in addition giving the Senate the sole power to appoint the members of the Supreme 
Court; its report of August 6 also gave them the authority to appoint ambassadors (as well as 
                                                 
83 Id. at 230–31, 236–37.  A similar document providing that the entire Congress had the power to appoint the 
members of the Supreme Court is recognized as being current as of the beginning of the day on June 12.  Id. at 225 
n.4, 226. 
84 2 id. at 37, 41, 44. 
85 Id. at 38, 41, 44. 
86 Id. at 38, 44. 
87 Id. at 38–39, 46. 
88 Id. at 71–72, 83. 
89 Id. at 72, 83 
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make treaties).90  The authority to “constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court” rested 
with the entire legislature.91  The power to appoint all other officers rested with the president.92 
 The recommendations of the Committee of Detail provided an occasion to revisit the idea 
of an executive council.  On August 18, Oliver Ellsworth again proposed that the president be 
advised by a council consisting of the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and the heads of 
the departments of foreign affairs, domestic affairs, war, finance, and marine.93  Charles 
Pinckney noted that Gouverneur Morris was planning to submit a similar proposal and suggested 
that the matter be postponed until the Convention could consider both proposals.94  Pinckney 
preferred allowing chief executives to seek advice as they thought best, warning that a strong 
council would tend to thwart the executive and that a weak one would only provide a pretext for 
the chief executive to disavow responsibility.95 
 Morris submitted his proposal two days later on August 20, seconded by Pinckney.  It 
advocated establishing a Council of State comprised of the same officials suggested by Ellsworth 
minus the President of the Senate.96  The proposal made clear that the purpose of this council 
was to assist the president and not to serve as an independent repository of executive power.  The 
president could “submit any matter to the discussion of the Council of State, and . . . may require 
the written opinions of any one or more of the members.”97  But the president “shall in all cases 
exercise his own judgment, and either Conform to such opinions or not as he may think 
proper.”98   
                                                 
90 Id. at 183. 
91 Id. at 182. 
92 Id. at 185. 
93 2 id. at 328–29. 
94 Id. at 329 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 342–43. 
97 Id. at 343. 
98 2 id. at 343–44. 
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 These proposals were referred back to the Committee of Detail,99 which issued a 
supplemental report on August 22 endorsing what it called a “Privy-Council” consisting of the 
members suggested by Morris as well as the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House.100  Again the language made clear that the Council was subordinate to the president and 
was not an independent repository of executive power.  Instead, the Privy Council was simply 
charged with advising the president “respect the execution of his Office, which he shall think 
proper to lay before them:  But their advice shall not conclude him, nor affect his responsibility 
for the measures which he shall adopt.”101   
 The Convention returned to the question of the appointment power on August 23, when 
Wilson supported Gouverneur Morris’s complaint that bodies like the Senate were too numerous, 
subject to cabal, and devoid of responsibility to wield the appointment power.102  Rather than 
follow this suggestion, the Convention expanded the Senate’s authority by expanding its 
appointment power to include “other public ministers” as well as ambassadors and judges.103  
Some inconsequential jousting over minor changes to the president’s residual appointment power 
ensued on August 24.104 
 Questions about an advisory council and the appointment power were included in the 
matters that had been postponed or on which no action had been taken committed to the 
Committee of Eleven on August 31.105  When the Committee of Eleven issued its report on 
September 4, all mention of a Privy Council had disappeared in favor of the familiar language 
specifying that the president “may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each 
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of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective 
offices.”106  Morris later explained that the Committee believed that an executive council would 
allow the president to avoid responsibility for any actions that turned out to be mistakes.107 
 With respect to the appointment power, the Committee of Eleven report eliminated 
appointment by the Senate in favor of nomination by the president subject to the advice and 
consent of the Senate.108  The abandonment of direct senatorial appointment came at a price, 
however:  The advice and consent power now applied to all officers of the U.S. and was no 
longer limited to judges, ambassadors, and other public ministers.109 
 The Committee of Eleven’s September 4 report appeared to sound a death knell for the 
idea of an executive council.  Wilson commented again about the Senate’s inability to make 
appointments well on September 6, when criticizing the role envisioned for the Senate in 
selecting the president when the Electoral College failed to yield a clear majority.110  Yet during 
the debates on September 7, the idea of an advisory council was to receive an unlikely advocate 
in the person of Wilson.  Wilson reiterated his belief that the proper execution of the law depends 
on the ability to appoint responsible officers to execute it and that appointment represented a 
quintessential executive power.111  When faced with a proposal that would subject presidential 
nominations of all federal officers to confirmation by the Senate, however, Wilson believed that 
senatorial involvement in the appointment power would destroy executive responsibility.112  
Compared with this alternative, Wilson preferred an advisory executive council of the type 
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proposed by Mason to giving the Senate a role in the appointment power.113  The Convention 
disagreed, unanimously affirming the Senate’s role in confirming appointments and voting 9 to 2 
to confirm the decision to extend it to all federal officers.114   
 Mason followed this exchange by making a last ditch effort to revive the idea of an 
executive council by proposing that it consist of two members each from the eastern, middle, and 
southern states, appointed either by the Legislature or the Senate.115  Benjamin Franklin, John 
Dickinson, and Madison all supported the proposal.116  The real shock was that Wilson spoke in 
favor of it as well, again as an alternative to giving the Senate a role in appointments.117  The 
Convention rejected Mason’s amendment by a vote of 3 states to 8.118   
 Wilson’s consistent opposition to an advisory council made his support for it in 
conjunction with a power that he regarded as quintessentially executive quite surprising would 
seem to contradict the vision Wilson as a doctrinaire advocate of a strong, unitary presidency.  
Indeed, in his Lectures on Law delivered after the Constitution’s ratification, James Wilson 
applauded the lack of the constitutional council: 
In the United States, our first executive magistrate is not obnubilated behind the 
mysterious obscurity of counselors. Power is communicated to him with 
liberality, though with ascertained limitations. To him the provident or 
improvident use of it is to be ascribed.  For the first, he will have and deserve 
undivided applause. For the last, he will be subjected to censure; if necessary, to 
punishment. He is the dignified, but accountable magistrate of a free and great 
people.119 
 A close analysis of the reasons Wilson gave for his change of heart and a careful 
examination of the context surrounding this decision provide a much richer and more nuanced 
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understanding of the executive branch.  Wilson was willing to compromise unitariness if 
necessary to recalibrate the larger balance of power between the branches.  Admittedly, this 
concession may have been nothing more than the product of realpolitik.  But even that implicitly 
acknowledges that the content of executive power is a human construct rather than a matter of 
principle not subject to negotiation.  Indeed, it was the more important issue of the appointment 
power that led Wilson to compromise. 
C. The Veto Power 
 The positions that Wilson took with respect to the veto further illustrate his non-
doctrinaire approach to executive power.  The initial proposal contained in the Virginia Plan 
submitted on May 29 called for the veto power to reside in a “council of revision” composed of 
“the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary.”120  This veto would be final 
unless passed by an unspecified supermajority of Congress.121 
 The Convention took up the issue on June 4.  Gerry submitted a successful amendment 
eliminating the council of revision, thereby removing the judiciary from any role in the exercise 
of the qualified veto.122  Wilson, seconded by Hamilton, proposed an amendment to eliminate the 
legislative override that the Convention rejected unanimously.123  Gerry then successfully moved 
to set the necessary majority to override a presidential veto at two thirds.124  Then, somewhat 
curiously, Wilson, seconded by Madison, attempted to reintroduce the courts into the process by 
restoring the requirement that the national executive exercise the veto power in conjunction with 
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“a convenient number of the national judiciary.”125  At Hamilton’s request, debate was 
postponed until June 6,126 at which time Wilson renewed his plea for including the judiciary in 
the veto power.127  The Convention rejected Wilson’s proposal by a vote of 3 to 8.128   
 Wilson renewed this proposal on July 21 after the adoption of the Great Compromise and 
before the appointment of the Committee of Detail during the time the small states had walked 
out of the Convention.129  Despite Wilson’s and Madison’s assurances that such an arrangement 
would not violate the separation of powers and was necessary to counterbalance the weight of 
the legislature,130 the amendment was defeated again by the narrower vote of 3 to 4, with 2 states 
divided.131 
 Consistent with the debates of June 4 and 6 and despite the fact that Wilson was the 
primary drafter of the report, the Committee of Detail’s report of August 4 provided for a 
presidential veto that was subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses of 
Congress.132  The Convention debated this proposal on August 15.  Madison, seconded by 
Wilson, proposed adding the Supreme Court to the veto process and increasing the supermajority 
needed for an override to three fourths should both the president and a majority of the Supreme 
Court object to the legislation.133  This proposal failed by a vote of 3 to 8.134  Williamson’s 
subsequent motion to increase the supermajority required to override a presidential veto to three 
fourths passed by a vote of 6 to 4, with 1 state divided.135 
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 The Committee of Style’s report of September 12 incorporated the presidential veto 
subject to being overridden by three fourths of both Houses of Congress.136  When the 
Convention debated the report later that day, it immediately reversed its decision of August 15 
and reduced the supermajority required for Congress to override a presidential veto back to two 
thirds.137  This final language was integrated into the Constitution. 
 As might have been anticipated, Wilson initially argued that the executive should have an 
absolute veto (without judicial participation or being subject legislative override) on the grounds 
that the three branches should be kept distinct and independent as possible.138  As noted earlier, 
this proposal failed unanimously.139  What is harder to explain was his support on June 4, June 6, 
and August 15 for Madison’s proposal to vest the veto power jointly in the executive and the 
Supreme Court.  It is possible that Wilson insisted on executive unity only with respect to core 
executive powers, but not with respect executive involvement in legislative powers such as the 
veto.140  Whatever the explanation, it is clear that Wilson’s views on the separation of powers 
were far from rigid.  Quite the contrary, it exhibits a willingness to reallocate powers in an 
attempt to strike the proper balance between the branches.  In the words of one historian, “[t]he 
need to control the legislature was more important than the principle of a strictly unitary 
executive authority.”141  
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D. Presidential Selection 
 Aside from the Great Compromise, the selection of the executive represented perhaps the 
most controversial issue during the Conventionand the issue on which Wilson came the closest to 
losing.142  The Virginia Plan had proposed selection of the executive by the legislature.143  
Wilson initially suggested direct election of the President on June 1.144  When that idea received 
a tepid response, Wilson instead formally proposed election by an electoral college, only to see 
that proposal rejected by a vote of 2 to 8 and legislative selection affirmed by a vote of 8 to 2.145   
 The Convention debated the issue again on July 17, immediately following the Great 
Compromise.  Despite Wilson’s support, direct elections were rejected by a vote of 1 to 9, and 
selection by an electoral college was rejected by a vote of 2 to 8, after which the provision that 
the President be chosen by the legislature was unanimously reaffirmed.146   
 The issue would arise again two days later on July 19 when the Convention debated 
whether presidents would be allowed to stand for reelection.  Madison pointed out that if the 
legislature selected the president, re-eligibility would make the Presidents dependent on the 
legislature.147  Wilson noted the unanimous sense of the Convention that the President should not 
be selected by the legislature if eligible to serve a second term and observed with evident 
pleasure that the idea of popular election, either directly or indirectly through an electoral 
college, was gaining ground.148  Madison noted that direct election was probably the best 
principle, but the differing nature of the franchise in northern and southern states led him to favor 
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an electoral college.149  The motion to reconsider was rejected by a vote of 3 to 7.150  The 
Convention then approved a proposal to elect the president by an electoral college by a vote of 6 
to 3 and agreed that those electors would be selected by state legislatures by a vote of 8 to 2.151   
 Five days later on July 24, John Houstoun’s motion to reconsider presidential section via 
the electoral college was rejected by the narrower vote of 4 to 7.152  A series of additional 
proposals followed, including a somewhat bizarre suggestion from Wilson that the President be 
elected fifteen members of Congress chosen by lot.153  Wilson stated that he had not given his 
proposal much thought and that he preferred direct election.154  Consequently, he acceded to the 
decision to postpone consideration of his proposal.155 
 When the Convention reconvened on July 25, the delegates struggled to reconcile re-
eligibility with legislative selection.  Ellsworth moved for legislative selection of first-term 
presidents and for selection by electors appointed by state legislatures in the case of re-eligible 
candidates was rejected by a vote of 4 to 7.156  Although Butler, Morris, and Madison spoke in 
favor of Wilson’s proposed electoral college, the Convention failed to concur, and the entire 
issue was committed to the Committee of Detail.157 
 The Committee of Detail’s report of August 6 reaffirmed the idea of legislative selection, 
notwithstanding the fact that Wilson was the report’s principal author.158  But the entire issue 
was reframed by the Committee of Eleven’s report of August 31, which gave the Presidency 
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most of its familiar outlines:  a four-year term, eligibility for reelection, selection by an electoral 
college chosen by a method determined by each state legislature, with elections in which no 
candidate received an electoral college majority being decided by the Senate.159  On September 
6, the Convention substituted the House for the Senate.160  After many twists, turns, and 
hardships, Wilson’s proposal for presidential selection by electoral college finally prevailed.  The 
core concern was that legislative selection would render any president planning to seek 
reelection unduly subservient to Congress. 
II. UNDERSTANDING WILSON’S VIEWS ON EXECUTIVE POWER 
 Although Wilson is often portrayed as an adamant supporter of presidential power, his 
switch with respect to an executive council and his views with respect to the veto and 
presidential selection reveal that his beliefs may not have been as simple as is typically believed.  
Indeed, when his decision is placed within the broader context of the positions he took during the 
Convention supporting direct democracy, favoring institutional design over class divisions, a 
strong argument emerges that the Constitution is better regarded as a reflection of Wilson’s 
vision for the country, not Madison’s. 
A. Wilson, the Executive Power Pragmatist 
 Wilson’s reversal on the executive council is most easily understood as a reflection of his 
pragmatic conception of the executive power.  As an initial matter, it is useful to differentiate 
between two distinct concepts that are often conflated together:  the unitary executive and 
inherent executive power.  The former addresses the institutional form that the executive branch 
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should take.  The latter addresses the scope of the power the executive branch should wield.  
Taking a strong position with respect to one does not necessarily require taking a strong position 
with respect to the other.  More specifically, one can adopt a narrow vision on the scope of 
inherent executive power and yet nonetheless insist that whatever power is properly considered 
executive in nature (either because it is inherently executive or because the Constitution 
conferred that power on the president as a matter of positive law) must be wielded by a single 
person. 
 Focusing on the scope of inherent power, Wilson is far from an executive power 
essentialist or an executive power maximalist.  While Wilson was a strong supporter of executive 
unitariness, he exhibited greater flexibility when discussing the scope of executive power.  In this 
sense, Wilson shared the inherent pragmatism of the other Founders.161  McLaughlin notes, “The 
men of the convention, and Wilson above all, were not rote-learners:  they did not absorb 
unquestioningly the lessons of Blackstone or of Montesquieu.  They were themselves original 
seekers after truth, making their own inductions and extracting the principles of their science 
from the raw materials of history.”162  Indeed, Wilson did not base his arguments in favor of a 
unitary executive on citations to Blackstone, although he clearly could have done so.163  Instead, 
Wilson offered his own normative defense of the institution based on energy, accountability, and 
democratic values. 
 Wilson’s non-doctrinaire approach to executive power was also apparent in his positions 
taken with respect to the veto and the appointment power.  As noted above, although Wilson 
supported giving the president an absolute veto, he proposed various alternatives that would have 
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included the judiciary in the veto process.  Similarly, although Wilson regarded appointment as 
one of two quintessentially executive powers (with the other being the power to execute the 
law)164 and initially opposed given the legislature any role, he compromised in response to 
efforts to give Congress the power to appoint Supreme Court justices and lower court judges and 
a later proposal to give the Senate the power to appoint ministers and ambassadors as well, 
making the surprising proposal to augment the presidency with an council to advise it regarding 
appointments. 
B. Wilson, the Democrat 
 Even more fundamental to Wilson’s position on the proper scope of executive power was 
his belief in democracy.  Ultimately his willingness to compromise on structural matters was 
counterbalanced by the Convention’s willingness to embrace democratic principles.165 
1. Madison’s Distrust of Democracy and Embrace of Mixed Government 
 Many in the Convention harbored a healthy distrust of what they called the 
“extravagances of the populace.”166  The principal embodiment of this perspective was Madison.  
According to his notes from the Convention, Madison began from the premise that “[i]n all 
civilized Countries the people fall into different classes havg. a real or supposed different 
interests,” “particularly the distinction of rich & poor.”167   As population increased, “the equal 
laws of suffrage”  will cause power to “slide into the hands” of the agrarian poor would exhibit a 
“leveling spirit” that sought to impose a forcible redistribution of the nation’s wealth.168 
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 Madison’s solution was to conduct elections through a series of “successive filtrations” 
designed to insulate the government from the democratic will.169  As an initial step, Madison 
would limit the franchise to those owning real property, warning that unlanded citizens “will 
become the tools of opulence & ambition.”170  Although voters would elect the House of 
Representatives, Madison proposed that the Senate be elected by the House of Representatives 
instead of through direct elections.171   
 The Senate was the key institution to Madison’s vision for the federal government.  A 
Senate constituted through indirect elections would be composed of a small number of 
“enlightened citizens.”172   The Senate, moreover, was supposed to represent the wealth of the 
nation173 and have as “one of its primary objects the guardianship of property.”174  As such, the 
Senate was designed to serve as a “check on democracy.”175  As Madison would later state in his 
letter to Jefferson describing what had transpired at the Convention, the Senate would serve as 
the “great anchor of the Government.”176 
 To achieve this, Madison envisioned a Senate comprised of a relatively small number of 
members serving relatively long terms and invested with vast power,177 including the authority to 
negotiate treaties,178 appoint judges,179 and even invalidate state legislation.180  Madison argued 
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that representation in the Senate would be proportional to population not out of some 
commitment to equality, but rather to ensure that Virginia would be well represented in what 
would be the most powerful institution in the federal government.181  The proposed primacy of 
the Senate helps explain why Madison gave so little thought to the design of the executive, 
because in his vision of a government dominated by the Senate, the president was simply an 
auxiliary player.182 
 In this sense, Madison’s conception is less like the American conception of the separation 
of powers and more like the traditional British tradition of mixed government.  Mixed 
government bears some superficial similarity to the U.S. vision of separated powers leavened by 
a system of checks and balances, but in its essence is based on fundamentally different 
principles.  As M.J.C. Vile noted in his landmark book, however, mixed government relies on 
supposed differences among different social classes of people in ways that are generally 
considered antithetical to the America’s traditional hostility towards aristocracy.183 
 The theory of mixed government envisioned that society was constituted of three 
elements—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—and sought to blend each of these groups 
into every function of government.184  The central concern was to use the royal and aristocratic 
elements to as a check on the democratic element’s tendency toward “mob rule.”185  The idea, 
then, is not to divide power for its own sake or to segregate particular functions that should be 
kept separate for theoretical reasons.  Instead, mixed government is based on maintaining a 
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dynamic tension between the different social classes, paying particular attention to favor the 
upper classes. 
 This balance was implemented through the institutions of government, and the 
institutional forms were purely instrumental toward these goals.  Although there was a tendency 
to equate the executive with the monarchy, the judiciary with the aristocracy, and the legislature 
with democracy, mixed government did not perceive any particular institution as having an 
essentialist character.186  The mutability of functions is demonstrated eloquently by the British 
government, which blended executive, legislative, and judicial functions in the Crown, selected 
executive ministers from the members of Parliament, and allowed the House of Lords to evolve 
into a judicial body.  The separation of powers, in contrast, allows the nature of particular 
governmental functions to determine to which branch it should be assigned.  Rather than 
blending functions across multiple institutions, once a function has been allocated to a branch, 
the separation of powers attempts to ensure that no other branch can interfere with its exercise.187   
 Mixed government is thus based on principles that are quite different from those 
underlying the separation of powers and indeed conflicts with it to a considerable extent.188  Both 
concepts share a common focus on relying on institutional internal checks within the government 
to guard against abuses of power, but for different reasons.189  The separation of powers prevents 
the aggrandizement of power by dividing functions according to an abstract principle and 
isolating those sets of functions into separate spheres.  Mixed government requires some division 
of functions, but is not wedded to any particular allocation of power.  Instead, it relies on what 
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Vile called “the separation of agencies”190 or what modern scholars might call “the separation of 
functions”191 that simply required that powers be divided without embodying any preconceived 
vision of how that would be done.  The checking was done not by the differences in the 
institutions, but rather by the differences in the nature of the people constituting those 
institutions. 
 The inapplicability of mixed government to a country where monarchy and aristocracy 
were considered anathema naturally led the former colonists to eschew it in favor of the 
separation of powers when organizing the new state governments.192  Aside from the 
constitutions of South Carolina, New Hampshire, and New Jersey, which were all intended to be 
temporary, the state constitutions drafted in 1776 and early 1777 embraced the separation of 
powers as an organizing principle and rejected any concept of checks and balances, although the 
weakness of the Governors and the strength of the legislatures created by these constitutions 
meant that the embrace of the concept of limited import.193  Still, the non-viability of mixed 
government as a theory left Americans with no other alternative.194  But the separation of powers 
left many key questions unanswered, including how the executive should be selected, whether 
the legislature should be bicameral or unicameral, and ambiguities about where certain powers 
should reside.195 
 Equally importantly, early state legislatures began to engage in a wide range of abuses, 
most notably the failure to protect private property,196 but also including failure to respect 
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religious freedom, the rights of criminal defendants, and freedom of the press.197  The separation 
of powers offered no way to place limits on the legislature aside from elections.198  As Vile 
notes, “unlike the theory of mixed government, which opposed power with power, the pure 
separation of powers depended upon an intellectual distinction between the functions of 
government for its safeguard and upon elections for its sanction.”199  That explains why later 
state constitutions, including New York and Massachusetts, began to move away from the strict 
separation of powers.200 
 Many of the leading writers of the day continued to be influenced by the mixed 
government vision of the state.  John Adams’s vision of the separation of powers showed such 
clear sympathy for monarchy and aristocracy201 that Thomas Paine was provoked to complain 
that Adams’s “head was a full of kings, queens and knaves as a pack of cards.”202 
2. Wilson’s Embrace of Democracy 
 In this debate, Wilson espoused a very different vision of government.  Mixed 
government was inappropriate for the U.S., as it was “suited to an establishment of different 
orders of men.”203  Instead, Wilson envisioned a government based on the sovereignty of the 
people.204  The contrast between Madison’s and Wilson’s position was stark.  As Vile has noted, 
the idea of delegation of power from the people “is deeply opposed to the ideas of the balanced 
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constitution, in which important elements were independent of popular power, and able to check 
the representatives of hat power.”205   
 Moreover, Wilson regarded men as being fundamentally equal, perhaps not in all 
respects, but at least with respect to creating a civil government.206  He thus opposed making 
property ownership a prerequisite for voting and favored making the franchise as broad as 
possible.207  Not only could the electorate be trusted; participating in elections would serve an 
educative function by forcing people to look beyond their limited circle and thereby heighten 
their awareness of the interdependence of society.208 
 Wilson espoused democratic positions on a wide range of other issues.  He opposed an 
unsuccessful attempt to replace direction election of the members of the House of 
Representatives with selection by state legislatures209 and advocated unsuccessfully for direct 
election of Senators.210  He opposed imposing property qualifications on both the franchise211 
and as a precondition to serving in Congress.212  He insisted that the Constitution be ratified by 
state conventions instead of by Congress.213  And he was the only delegate to favor proportional 
representation as a matter of justice.214  He thus opposed efforts to have each state represented 
equally in the Senate215 as well as proposals to limit the representation of newly admitted states 
in the west.216 
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 Perhaps Wilson’s greatest labor in support of direct democracy is his advocacy in favor 
of the direct election of the President.  As discussed above, the Convention’s rejection of this 
proposal led him to offer the ultimately successful compromise of relying on an electoral college.  
And even this proposal was repeatedly rejected until the waning days of the Convention when 
the Framers’ desire to permit George Washington to stand for reelection led them to reject 
congressional selection of the president. 
 The principle animating Wilson’s positions is that direct elections from a broad franchise 
best reflect the power of the people, which is the source from which all sovereignty flows.217  
Moreover, his believe in the equality of all citizens led him to adhere to the principle of one 
person, one vote.  His reasons for favoring direct election of the Senate were thus squarely in 
conflict with Madison’s filtration model of the Senate.218  Rather than viewing selection by 
different approaches to be a good thing, Wilson argued that both branches of Congress should 
rest on the same foundation:  the power of the people at large.219  His opposition to the Great 
Compromise was not because it undercut Madison’s vision of the Senate as a repository of 
wisdom and stability, but rather for its abandonment of the principles of equal representation.220   
 In short, Wilson and Madison proceeded from fundamentally different premises.  For 
Madison, the government was designed to represent social interests, whereas for Wilson, the 
government was designed to represent individuals.221  The differences between Madison’s and 
Wilson’s positions also explain their disparate reactions to the Great Compromise.  It effectively 
killed Madison’s animating vision of setting up the Senate as a filter to limit democracy and as 
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the dominant governmental institution.  While it also represented a setback for Wilson’s vision 
based on popular sovereignty, it far from killed it.222  In addition, the he viewed the fundamental 
unit of politics to be the individual, not the states.223 
C. Wilson, the Institutionalist 
 But Wilson’s commitment to democracy did not extend only to participation in elections.  
In addition, it was about promoting accountability.  Accountability stems from three sources.  
The first is the tendency of plurality to obscure responsibility already discussed above.  The 
second focuses on certain fundamental differences between legislatures and executives.  The 
third turns on the relationship between the size of the electoral district and the responsiveness of 
elected officials to the popular will.  Wilson was able to use these various insights to construct a 
system that depended neither on underlying social differences among classes of people nor the 
immutable nature of the governmental functions to define how powers would be divided.  
Moreover, it was able to avoid the need to hermetically seal the branches off from one another by 
creating a new basis for dynamic interaction based on institutional design rather than class. 
 Wilson did not share Madison’s reflexive fear that the government would be too strong.  
Instead, Wilson’s primary concern was that the government would be too weak.224  Specifically, 
one of the Framers’ central concerns was the danger of all power being drawn into the legislative 
vortex.225  Wilson thus saw the need to use other institutions as counterbalances to legislative 
power.  The problem is that the rejection of the class-based institutions associated with mixed 
government left Wilson searching for other bases for identifying other institutions. 
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 Instead of class differences, Wilson relied on institutional differences between different 
types of actors.  For example, plural institutions like legislatures do not plan well, lack secrecy 
and decisiveness, and often lose focus on the common good.226  Moreover the nature of the 
checks on the two branches is different.227  Wilson noted in his lectures on law, “The restraints 
on the legislative authority must, from its nature, be chiefly internal; that is, they must proceed 
from some part or division of itself.  But the restraints on the executive power are external.”228  
And external restraints require clear lines of responsibility.  Thus, as Wilson noted during the 
Convention, “In order to control the Legislative authority, you must divide it.  In order to control 
the Executive you must unite it.”229 
 Wilson also suggested that large electoral districts are less likely to elect bad 
representatives than small ones, because small districts provide the greatest opportunity for bad 
men to intrigue their way into office.230  This reaches its logical conclusion in the President, who, 
having been elected by different parts of the country, will consider himself charged with 
watching over the entire nation rather than favoring particular parts of it.231  The President then 
“may justly be styled the man of the people,”232 a concept often regarded as a post-revolutionary 
idea associated with Andrew Jackson.233 
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 These differences provide some justification for dividing power that are distinct from the 
class-based system of mixed government.  Because these categories avoid the categorical 
approach of the strict separation of powers, it permitted the development of checks and balances 
between the branches.  For example, the legislature would be restrained by bicameralism and by 
the executive and judicial departments through the veto and judicial review.”234 
 At the time, Wilson was quite concerned that the current structure would turn President 
into a “Minion of the Senate.”235  He opposed the role the Senate was initially supposed to play 
in resolving presidential elections that did not yield a clear electoral college majority, a role that 
was eventually transferred to the House of Representatives.  He similarly disliked the role of the 
Senate in ratifying treaties, which he also proposed be shifted to the House.236 
 But Wilson’s biggest concern during the closing days of the Convention was the role of 
the Senate in appointments.  Wilson regarded appointments as an executive function and argued 
that giving the power to the legislature would create partiality and reduce accountability.237  The 
Committee of Detail had given the Senate the exclusive right to appoint judges and 
ambassadors.238  The Committee of Eleven transferred the power to the President, making 
nominations subject to confirmation by the Senate, while simultaneously expanding it to cover 
all executive officials.239 
 Framing as Wilson as a nonessentialist who cared about accountability as a means of 
promoting democracy provides a possible explanation for the reason he embraced augmenting 
the single executive with an advisory council during the waning days of the Convention.  Wilson 
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was more concerned about the lack of democratic accountability resulting from the blurring of 
responsibility than he was about the diminution of executive power.240  In the process, he created 
a uniquely American vision of the separation of powers that preserved the checks and balances 
of mixed government without assuming any of the aristocratic baggage.241 
D. Wilson, the Nationalist 
 Equally fundamentally, Wilson rejected the Virginia conception that civic virtue required 
that the country remain a small, agrarian republic.  Influenced by the Scottish school of political 
economy led by Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and David Hume, Wilson developed a view that 
interaction with a large community developed civic virtue in a different way by underscoring 
people’s interdependence and shared human nature.242  A person elected by a broad elector 
would not be obligated to particular economic or local interests and would instead have to appeal 
to a wider range of people representing a broader range of interrelated interests.243  At the same 
time, voters’ participation in a national election would develop their public spirit by making 
them more aware of the different ways of life reflected in the larger community in which they 
live.244   
 Wilson saw was the need to create a strong state broad enough to knit these different 
communities together into a nation.245  This conception views the state is a potential edifier 
rather than a necessary evil.246  The lesson of the Articles of Confederation is that a government 
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that is too can be as big a concern as a government that is too strong.  Equally important was 
ensuring that the federal government was not simply the minion of the state governments.247 
CONCLUSION 
 What emerges is a vision of Wilson that is more complex that the idea of a simple 
adherent of executive power.  Instead, Wilson’s positions are animated by a commitment to 
democracy, a keen awareness of institutional design, and a vibrant sense of how to create a 
national polity.  That said, willingness to reallocate powers during the Framing does not 
necessarily authorize further reallocation post-ratification.  The balance enshrined in the 
Constitution is intended to be enduring. 
 Even more importantly, a comparison of Wilson’s vision for the nation with Madison’s is 
quite revealing.  Madison hoped to create a plutocracy of small landowners with a limited 
franchise governed largely by a Senate comprised of the landed gentry.  Wilson hoped to create a 
large, integrated nation with a strong commitment to broad-based democracy in which the 
presidency was the preeminent institution.  A moment’s reflection reveals that Wilson’s vision is 
the one that became a reality. 
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